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Made in China 2025: China’s Strategy for Becoming a Global
High-Tech Superpower and its Implications for the U.S.
Economy, National Security, and Free Trade
Abstract
This article addresses how China’s discriminatory trade practices and illicit means of
foreign technology acquisition under its Made in China 2025 plan undermine current
international trade orders and pose the greatest threat to its existence. Using both primary
and secondary data, this article highlights major implications that Made in China 2025 has
on free trade, the overall health of the U.S. economy, and U.S. national security. It proposes
a multilateral strategy to preserve the current trade system to steer China on track toward
honoring its commitment to free trade and identifies how the United States can maintain
supremacy throughout the twenty-first century.
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Introduction
China’s General Secretary Xijing Ping’s handling of the COVID-19
pandemic precipitated the recent wave of anti-Chinese sentiments
pervasive throughout the United States, which resulted in more than
190,000 deaths in the United States and brought the global economy to a
standstill, with nearly 30 million people unemployed.1 The pandemic
spawned great debates among politicians and researchers regarding
whether China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
2001 has severely harmed the multilateral rule, which derives from the
free trading system. Despite the Communist Party’s discriminatory trade
policies in the form of subsidies, antidumping measures, and
discrimination against imports, China boasts about its outstanding record
of compliance with the WTO’s dispute settlement rules. The dispute
settlement body takes years to render a decision, during which China
benefits from its disputed policy while under review. Once the body makes
a decision and if the challenge succeeds, China could comply, having
reaped the benefits and remaining one-step ahead.2 If China appeals the
decision, it again stays one-step ahead of the organization’s response time
when acting on violations. With the United States running a trade deficit
of $378.6 billion (2018) with China, the Trump Administration has vowed
to hold China accountable for unfair trade practices that have severely
damaged the American economy and businesses.3
This article addresses how China’s discriminatory trade practices and
illicit means of acquiring foreign technology under its Made in China 2025
plan undermine current international trade orders and pose the greatest
threat to its existence. This article also addresses how China’s unfair trade
practices have major implications for the overall health of the U.S.
economy and U.S. national security. Revising WTO to meet challenges of
the twenty-first century can resolve the challenges that China poses to the
system of free and fair trade. This article reviews literature related to
strategic trade policy consistent with developing and nurturing key
industries. It then examines Xi Jinping’s Made in China plan, designed to
catch up to, surpass, and displace the United States as the leading world
industrial power. This article addresses major implications that China’s
discriminatory trade practices have had on the United States, including
how the community of member nations can preserve current international
liberal trade order and get China on track to ensure that all WTO members
1
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2020

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 13, No. 3

follow the same rules. If this remains unaddressed, the world might be
heading toward mercantilist policies that prioritize protectionism over free
trade.

Literature Review
Consensus among researchers suggests that the state plays an important
role in promoting technology, a role debated broadly by two schools of
thought—the developmental state and Dirigiste. The developmental state
approach examines developing the state’s capacity and ability to create,
guide, protect, and nurture key industries deemed important to greater
economic development and growth until they have developed sufficiently
to compete with and possibly surpass foreign rivals. The Dirigiste
approach examines how industrialized nations assist and guide faltering or
less competitive industries deemed important to a country’s economy and
national security. Enforcing economic direction and encouraging firms
through various incentives such as subsidies and government procurement
to follow a desired path accomplishes this. A third model, the China model
blends characteristics of the developmental and Dirigiste schools.
The Developmental Approach
Chalmers Johnson introduced the state developmental approach in his
book MITI and the Japanese Miracle, in which the author reviewed the
origins of Japan’s modern industrial policy and how it achieved great
economic growth and success in a short time.4 He attributed Japan’s
economic success to the ability of the country’s Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) to achieve state objectives by nurturing key
strategic industries such as steel, chemical fertilizers, and shipbuilding.
Many researchers have corroborated Johnson’s perspective by applying
his findings to other societies. Alice Amsden’s Asia’s Next Giant, for
example, attributes South Korea’s unprecedented economic growth over
the past century to the government’s economic interventions.5 Amsden
argues that all successful late-industrializing countries must have a strong
centralized government that is capable of influencing the pace and
direction of economic growth. The author argues that Korea’s success rests
heavily on a strong state and its ability to implement sound policies that
promote development of indigenous industries. South Korea has grown
faster than other economies because of the state’s ability to exert power
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over private firms.6 Robert Wade’s Governing the Market builds on
Johnson’s and Amsden’s ideas by advancing the governed market theory,
which emphasizes the government’s role in promoting significant direct
investment in key industries, with the intent of competing internationally.7
Although Johnson, Amsden, and Wade offer detailed empirical analyses of
the economic success of East Asian countries that engaged in state
economic interventions, Peter Evans took the state developmental
approach a step further by considering which configurations and
arrangements between state and industry are best suited to international
competitiveness and economic success.8 Evans begins with the assumption
that states play the role of agents of economic transformation best when
characterized by what he labels “embedded autonomy”—when they best
approximate the Weberian ideal type, which allots the state a degree of
autonomy but enables it to maintain good working relationships with
other sectors of society. When both characteristics are present, a state is
developmental, and Evans argues that such a state plays a major role in a
nation’s economic development.
The Dirigiste School
Manufacturing Matters summarizes and articulates the Dirigiste position
well, suggesting that the United States continues to send manufacturing
overseas in the mistaken belief that the nation is better off if its economy
moves toward greater service provision.9 United States economic decline is
the result of the country’s inability to find a niche in the market and thus
attempts to remain competitive by exploiting cheap labor abroad. The
United States can begin to become more competitive only if the
government makes it possible for manufacturing facilities to remain in the
country; it must help firms automate production. Increasingly relying on
automation rather than unskilled human labor would reduce production
costs and facilitate rapid diffusion of new technology to other economic
sectors, making products more competitive.
Laura Tyson’s book Who’s Bashing Whom echoes this perspective, which
argues that the poor state of the U.S. economy emanates from unfair and
manipulative state interventionist policies with Japanese and European
trading partners.10 To combat these disadvantages, Tyson proposes a
cautious activism strategy, calling for the United States to open foreign
markets to American products and suggesting that if unsuccessful,
3
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policymakers should threaten closure of U.S. markets and subsidize
selective high-tech industries.
Adherents to the Dirigiste School differ, however, on appropriate policy
responses. Gene Grossman disagrees with Tyson’s argument that the
United States should subsidize selective high-tech industries were the
country’s trading partners to engage in unfair trading practices.11 Although
he acknowledges the advantages a nation gains were it to choose the
correct industry to target, he also claims that policymakers do not have,
and might never have, sufficient, reliable information to warrant the
targeting of such industries. U.S. policy should instead create an
environment conducive to innovation and entrepreneurship, one that
prevents market failings. Government should promote education and
industrial R&D, which would improve international competitiveness.
China Model
Suisheng Zhao argues that China possesses attributes of both the
developmental state and the Dirigiste School because the government
blends essential features of a liberal market economy with authoritarian
rule. The state has grown to respect private property and promote
competition to a limited degree, while ensuring that the Communist Party
maintains a firm grip over society. It does so by censoring media, silencing
political opposition, selecting state-owned enterprises to become national
champions through subsidies that force technology transfers from foreign
companies in exchange for market share in select industries, and engaging
in human rights violations.12 Since technological determinism represents a
driving force behind cultural, societal, and political changes, Chinese
leaders have created a smart city in which it maintains control over society
using facial recognition cameras and social credit scores, allowing it to
monitor dissidents or anyone who challenges the Communist Party.13
However, China diverges from Johnson’s version of the developmental
model regarding subsidies, given primarily to state-owned enterprises
rather than private businesses, to guide, nurture, and protect industries
that develop the country’s economy and national security.
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China’s Industrial Policy
For over a decade, the Chinese government has made its intentions clear of
becoming an excellent industrial power, beginning with introduction of its
National Medium and Long Term Plan for Science and Technology (2006–
2020) (MLP), the predecessor to Made in China 2025. The Chinese
government stated in the plan that it would channel 2.5 percent of the
nation’s total GDP to research and development in areas of strategic
importance to future economic development and national security.14 The
government listed 16 pillar industries, including semiconductors, aviation,
and telecommunications, all of which are important to China becoming a
top-tier industrialized nation.15 Most importantly, MLP stated that China
is to develop capabilities for indigenous innovation and move into leading
positions in new science-based industries by the end of the plan period.16
Despite massive investment in key industrial sectors, China realized
obvious technological gaps that exist in comparison to the West, and it
thus committed to obtaining the world’s most advanced technology illicitly
in half the time it would have taken the country to produce it on its own,
while avoiding the cost and with the United States the most frequent
target. Hu Xitao mentions in Classified Insider regarding development
and construction of China’s aviation industry, a report written for policy
leaders and political elites to follow to reduce the technological divide with
the West.17
President Xi Jinping’s Made in China 2025 plan uses elements of the state
development approach and the Dirigiste School to place China on a path to
restoring what it believes is its rightful position as the world’s most
prominent global power by 2050, the hundredth anniversary of the
founding of the People’s Republic of China. The plan lays out targeted
goals, whereby China will no longer be a mere consumer of the world’s
most advanced technology, but active in creating, leading, and defining
international technological standards. China’s goal is to free itself from
dependency on foreign technology and develop indigenous, high-tech
capabilities that satisfy its lucrative domestic market and serve and
strengthen its military. However, after nearly losing a generation of
experts and scientists to Mao Zedong’s social experiments—The Great
Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution—the technological gap with the
West has widened and would take decades to catch up using a strong,
government-led industrial policy.18
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China has a severe shortage of engineers and scientists needed to develop
an excellent industrialized economy. The primary cause of the country’s
lack of innovativeness stems from social experiments that Mao Zedong
implemented, which led to mistreatment of scholars and experts because
they were opponents of the revolution. He jailed, tortured, killed, or
relocated to the countryside for reeducation hundreds of thousands of
citizens, setting China’s economic development back generations.19
Another prominent reason for its lack of innovativeness is that one-third
of students who study abroad in advanced fields of science and
engineering do not return to China once they graduate due to better
opportunities found in countries such as the United States and United
Kingdom.20 The brain drain has become a growing problem for China,
especially since the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. The reason students do
not return after graduation is because of social, economic, or political
problems; in China, political alienation, low income, poor living
conditions, insufficient research facilities, and mismanagement of high‐
level manpower are the reasons intellectuals seek opportunities abroad.21
Realizing its limitations and its desire to develop excellent technology,
China engages in discriminatory practices to catch up with and surpass the
West in advanced industries. Such practices include protecting its
markets, trading market share for technology transfers, issuing massive
subsidies to state-owned enterprises and large private companies, and
acquiring foreign technology illicitly, all of which are contrary to its
commitments to being a WTO member. The plan prioritizes acquisition of
advanced technology from foreign companies, with the intent of
assimilating the technology locally, digesting it, and innovating it—
tweaking or advancing existing technology so it can become a global
industry leader.22

Illicit Acquisition of Foreign Technology
Cyber Espionage
Engaging in commercial espionage is as simple as hacking into a
computer, which is on the rise and costs a thousand of the largest U.S.
companies more than $300 billion annually, and China is the world’s
worst offender.23 Thieves steal approximately $500 billion in trade secrets,
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research and development, and products that give companies a
competitive advantage from U.S. companies each year. Such theft has also
resulted in the loss of nearly 2 million U.S. jobs and technological
superiority in industries related to national defense.24 China has organized
and developed a well-coordinated campaign that targets Western
governments and companies by covertly stealing military and industrial
secrets using malicious spyware such as GhostNet in pursuit of shortcuts
that bolster economic and military modernization.25 Espionage results in
shorter timeframes while costing significantly less money. China would
otherwise have spent 10 years and $10 million on research and
development if it did not steal secrets and bribe competitors and foreign
nationals at the rate of about $1 million each to achieve the same if not
better results.26
Companies thus must contract or go out of business because they lose
competitive advantages to theft of the latest generations of technology, or
they suffer major losses by avoiding lucrative markets. A loss of advanced
technology results in a loss of high- tech jobs, where wages are
approximately 75 percent greater than the national average.27 Such theft
also represents a major threat to security; when military and high-tech
secrets are stolen, military superiority decreases. To engage in espionage,
the Chinese government recruits a range of people, organizations, and
operatives to obtain military and industrial technologies. Such threats
come from not only intelligence operatives, but ordinary Chinese citizens
whom the government bribed, coerced, or employed. Since no entity
controls or coordinates the PRC’s technology acquisition centrally, it is
difficult to combat, and the United States has thus suffered severe losses to
its economy, simultaneously posing a threat to national security.28
Obtaining Classified Information
China’s two professional intelligence agencies—Ministry of State Security
(MSS) and the PLA General Staff’s Military Intelligence Department
(MID)—have been effective at acquiring foreign technology illicitly, even
though they account only for a small percentage of the PRC’s foreign
science and technology collection. Non-professionals, including PRC
officials, bureaucrats, students, scientists, researchers, and other visitors
to the West, conduct much of the data collection.29 MSS, MID, and other
PRC-controlled organizations coerce such individuals into working on
their behalf. The Chinese government knows that since money motivates
7
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these individuals, it can, with the right amount, bribe them to commit
espionage.30 The Chinese government contacts PRC nationals and offers
them large amounts of money to steal sensitive technology and ship it back
to China.
Over 100,000 PRC nationals annually attend U.S. universities or remain
in the United States after graduation. The Chinese government is
interested in recruiting Chinese-born scholars who remain in the United
States. and have established strong networks in their respective fields.
They represent an asset because they might have access to important
scientific technology and classified data once employed in the United
States. For example, born in Taiwan, Wen Ho Lee acquired an education
in the United States and went on to work for Los Alamos. The United
States accused him of giving the PRC classified information on the W-88
warhead during the mid-1980s and information on nuclear weapons
during the 1990s. Although the evidence to convict him was insufficient,
he pled guilty to downloading classified information onto an unsecured
computer and served time under house arrest.31
Front Companies
Overseas governments and state bureaucracies have set up front
companies to get around laws that prevent sensitive technology transfers
and acquisitions between companies from disparate nations. Establishing
a company in a foreign country and hiding its identity so that the public
believes it is a local company seeking profit rids suspicion of obtaining
advanced technology and transferring it to the home country. According to
the 1999 Cox report, more than 3,000 PRC corporations exist in the
United States, many of which connect to the PLA or a state intelligence
service operative.32 This is particularly troublesome for law enforcement to
monitor because the Chinese government, and possibly intelligence
services, has become savvy at blurring lines between commercial, profitseeking enterprises and enterprises established to commit espionage.33
Joint Ventures
China has particularly been sending record numbers of scientists and
engineers to Silicon Valley in pursuit of commercial secrets to establish
business ventures with American companies where staff members might
have access to secret technology.34 Stealing company secrets does not
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require advanced and sophisticated methods; foreign intelligence services
have learned that using computer networks, people can easily access and
steal U.S. government and private sector information that would normally
require years of expensive technology or human assets to acquire. A
person can download sensitive documents onto USB flash drives, small
enough to conceal. The losses that a company can accrue from having its
secrets stolen are enormous.35
Purchasing of American Companies
Another tactic the Chinese government uses to get secret data and
technology is purchasing American companies. In 1996, the Chinese
purchased Sunbase Asia, an American company that produces ball
bearings for the U.S. military. No information is available regarding
whether anyone has transferred sensitive technology back to China.36 With
the purchase of high-tech companies, China could easily gain technology
that could strengthen its economy and military.
Purchasing Technology
PRC representatives who worked in high-tech Chinese companies or who
were government officials often bought sensitive technology, including
electronic equipment, due to the carelessness of the Department of
Defense, whose interest at the time was disposing of excess property.
Without properly checking codes, the department sold such equipment
without assessing whether someone could use it for military purposes. If
the codes had revealed that the equipment was a dual-use technology, the
government would have prohibited its sale. Due to considerable
carelessness, many PRC companies were able to bid on military equipment
and technology, avoiding suspicion by using American names to alleviate
fears that the technology would make its way to China. The PRC was able
to purchase a multi-axis machine tool profiler used to build wingspans for
the F-14 fighter for under $25,000 when the original price was over $3
million.37
Technology for Market Share
To access the Chinese market, foreign companies are unofficially required
to enter a joint venture with a Chinese firm under terms that require them
to share advanced technology and technological expertise. Since China has
9
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1.4 billion people, with 350 million living in first-world conditions who are
potential consumers of foreign products, foreign companies know how
advantageous it is to access the Chinese market. China has lured foreign
manufacturers into long-term, cooperative arrangements by guaranteeing
a large portion of their market as long as the manufacturers are willing to
educate local companies on how to produce such products and familiarize
them with the equipment, technology, and management needed to do so.38

Implications for the United States
The current liberal international order advocates free market principles,
under which companies compete over the price and quality of a product
with the expectation that players will comply with rules that uphold free
and fair market competition. Increased competition always improves
business because more products appear on the market, among which
customers can choose. Greater competition forces companies to seek
efficient ways of keeping production costs down by adopting the latest
technologies and product features. Cheaper products that contain the most
advanced technology have always been attractive to consumers.
As China continues to manipulate the liberal international order in its
favor by using protectionism, unfair subsidization, and theft of sensitive
technology, U.S. companies stand to lose substantial wealth and
technological superiority in high-end economic sectors and the military.
American companies have lost nearly $300 billion in revenue, which has
cost the country over 2 million jobs.39 Without greater help from the
American government to cover their losses or implement protectionist
policies, they had no choice but to contract, resulting in less money
invested in research and development. A slowing down of innovation and
product efficiency is also likely, which will make products less competitive
internationally and in turn affect the overall health of the economy
because innovation generates spillover into the private sector and
military.40
As companies begin to contract, downsizing will include a reduction in the
number of scientists and engineers who create, innovate, and thereby add
value to the broader economy and military. Such contractions discourage
students from entering engineering fields, hindering the country’s ability
to make substantial contributions to its economy in the future. Conversely,
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when businesses are doing well, they expand and increase their numbers
of employees, and when they are doing poorly, they downsize, laying off
workers, which affects state and local economies.
Technological superiority represents the foundation of the strength of the
U.S. military. Soldiers are sent into combat knowing they have access to
the world’s most sophisticated and advanced weapons.41 However,
maintaining a technological advantage comes only from maintaining a
highly diverse, sophisticated economy that benefits financially when it
upgrades its products. As companies continue to contract, downgrade, or
go out of business due to theft of their intellectual property by the Chinese,
the technological advantage regarding defense will slow while China’s
strengthens.
Contrary to evidence presented in this article, Chinese experts, and
scholars disagree with what they call unsupported assumptions regarding
China breaking WTO rules; they claim a stellar record of abiding by WTO
regulations. When the settlement dispute renders decisions regarding the
violations, China will make the necessary reforms. According to
Ambassador Liu Xiaoming, the current administration uses much U.S.
rhetoric of China’s non-compliance with WTO regulations, and constant
references to theft of technology as causes of the trade deficit, as a
scapegoat for its domestic problems. This began with the 2008 financial
crisis that led to a decrease in exports to China and a decline in overall
manufacturing as a result of U.S. business closures.42 The 2008 subprime
mortgage crisis led to a rise in asset prices. The income distribution gap in
the United States has widened like never before, and manufacturing has
declined. U.S. goods trade deficits hit a new high since 2009 and have
been growing ever since, leading China to redirect its economic policy to
greater independence and self-sufficiency through greater diversification
of domestic markets. The United States’ strict policy of prohibiting the sale
of dual-use technologies (that is, military and civilian use) urged China to
greater development and strengthening of its core high-tech sectors.43

Conclusion
China’s limitations regarding development of advanced technology led it to
acquire such technology illicitly, which includes forced technology
transfers, commercial espionage, intellectual property rights violations,
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and issuing of large subsidies to state-owned enterprises and private
companies. China’s opaqueness and its initial handling of COVID-19
encouraged the international community to reconsider the effectiveness of
multinational institutions such as WTO. China’s predatory policies pose
the greatest threat to preservation of the international liberal order and
the health and security of each member nation. WTO has thus far offered
no effective remedy for dealing with the challenges China poses to the
international system of trade. The organization has antiquated rules and
has not updated them in nearly 25 years. It also does not have a
formidable, pronounced way to redress the problem of China’s lack of
openness, the country’s consistent data falsification, and the government’s
channeling of money to state-owned enterprises that operate covertly as
private institutions. Thus, it is difficult for member nations to express
grievances against the country’s predatory practices, prompting calls for
new rules to cope with China’s violations of WTO regulations.44
The Trump Administration’s strategy for dealing with China was to place a
15 percent tariff on $300 billion worth of imports, designed to protect
American industries that continually suffer from China’s discriminatory
trade practices and intellectual property violations.45 However, the
strategy led to a trade war between the two countries, since China
retaliated with tariffs ranging from 5 percent to 7 percent on more than
$75 billion worth of U.S. goods.46 As part of phase one of an agreement
with China, Trump is willing to reduce tariffs imposed on China
substantially if it agrees to purchase $200 billion of American goods by
December 2021.47
History suggests that China has lied to each president from Clinton to
Obama regarding promises to implement nondiscriminatory policies,
respect intellectual property rights, and allow American banks to operate
and compete fairly in China.48 Without a timely remedy to deal with
China’s predatory practices, American companies will suffer immense
losses and might even go out of business before WTO renders a decision if
an entity files a grievance. For the preservation and legitimacy of the
liberal international trade order, removing bureaucratic red tape that
prevents the dispute settlement body from rendering decisions quickly and
sternly would resolve this issue.
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To redress the China challenge, it would be advantageous for the American
government to work with WTO members on revising the organization to
include a system that both caps and monitors direct and indirect product
subsidization. A rule should also disallow distinction between a private
company and state-owned enterprise that receives government subsidies.
A country should no longer be able to declare itself a developing nation to
receive special treatment regarding subsidization and import taxes.49 A
definition should consider a country as developing only if it constitutes
less than 0.5 percent or more of world trade.50 China has the second
largest economy in the world and a rule should disallow it from selfreporting as a developing nation; all high-income countries should abide
by the same rules.
WTO should also be responsible for monitoring member countries,
especially those that have a long history of violating intellectual property
laws, which include industrial policies that enhance the competitive
position of domestic firms. Technology theft poses a problem to domestic
companies’ ability to compete in the market, and WTO should address and
prevent it. WTO can address this easily were the Dispute Settlement Board
to render a decision within 6 months of an entity filing a complaint, with
the appeal process included. This would resolve all issues related to
violations of intellectual property unfairly discriminating against foreign
products or issuance of non-agreed on subsidies to indigenous companies
and enterprises. A violating country should suffer sanctions immediately
based on current and future financial gains it accumulated or expected to
accumulate from discriminatory policies. The country must then either
appeal or accept the decision.
It takes up to six years for the Dispute Settlement Board to reach a
decision.51 A complainant must file an initial suit and request that a panel
convene to hear the case. It then takes approximately 45 days for the WTO
to appoint a panel and up to six months for it to conduct and conclude an
investigation. In most cases, it takes up to a year for a WTO panel to
complete its proceedings and issue a decision, after which the defendant
can accept and comply with the decision or file an appeal with the
appellate body, which takes up to 90 days to issue a decision.52 The
appellate body’s decision is final, and countries must comply within the
allotted time. Worsening the process, compensation covers losses that
incurred only since the date that the complainant filed the grievance.53 If
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the defendant refuses to comply, the WTO can enforce countermeasures
against the state. This system encourages countries like China to break the
rules since it might have up to 6 years to benefit from them before
repealing them. If a country violates the same rule three times, WTO
members should consider suspending that nation from the organization.
If members cannot initiate such an agreement, the only alternative is for
the industry to move toward state-sponsored markets, based on limited
workings of the free market. For the United States to maintain its
international supremacy and meet China’s ascension of becoming a great
power, it must continue to upgrade its diverse, sophisticated economy in
which innovation spills over from the commercial side of the industry to
the military, and vice versa. The COVID-19 pandemic suggests that it is
important for the United States to diversify its supply chain, reducing
dependency on China, stockpiling security essentials, and encouraging
high-tech innovation. This includes automating manufacturing facilities so
that the country can continue to maintain its status as the most advanced
industrialized country.
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